Conflicts of interest over the generosity and structure of redistribution and social insurance (jointly: social policy) include that between the relatively poor and wealthy-which yields the familiar result that median-voter demand for broad redistribution increases in the income skew-and that between the safely employed and the unemployed or precariously employed-in which, instead, inequality reduces median-voter demand for social insurance. In each case, the generosity and structure of social policy may itself affect simultaneously the efficiency of the labor market and the political participation of the less fortunate, which latter affects the identity and so the income and job-security status of the median voter. Previous literature has generally emphasized one of these causal connections to the exclusion of the others, but their combination unavoidably indicates a system of endogenous relations between economic performance (unemployment/income-distribution), social policy (redistribution/social-insurance), and political participation. This paper represents an attempt to elaborate the nature of these endogenous relationships, to suggest plausible identification conditions derived from relevant theory and substance, and to offer empirical estimates of the resulting system of equations.
I. Introduction
One familiar line of political-economic theory emphasizes how the median voter, being poorer than average, favors broad-based income-redistribution; indeed, the median's desired amount of redistribution increases in the skew of the income distribution (Meltzer & Richard 1978 , 1981 . Another, more recent strand of thought stresses instead the conflicting interests between the safely employed and the non-or precariously employed (Moene & Wallerstein 2001 , Rueda 2005 ; from this perspective, inequality (i.e., poorer medians) reduces median-voter demand for social insurance, insurance being a normal good. In either case, though, the generosity and structure of redistribution and social insurance (call these jointly:
social policy) will simultaneously directly affect distributional outcomes in the labor market (Atkinson et al. 1995 , Danziger & Gottschalk 1995 , Gottschalk & Smeeding 1997 , Smeeding et al. 1990 , and thereby indirectly affect the efficiency of the labor market as well (e.g., Layard et al. 1990 ). Furthermore, these economic outcomes (Franzese 2002, ch. 2) and these social policies (Hobolt & Klemmenson 2006) will both simultaneously affect political participation by society's less fortunate, which in turn affects the identity and so the income and job-security status of the median voter. In sum, economic outcomes affect social policies and political participation; social policies affect economic outcomes and political participation; and political participation affects social policies.
1 Previous literature has generally emphasized one of these causal connections to the exclusion of the others, but their combination unavoidably indicates a system of endogenous relations between economic performance (unemployment/income-distribution), social policy (redistribution/social-insurance), and politics (here 1 The only omitted path among the six possible reflects the likelihood that political participation does not affect economic outcomes except through its impact on policies.
summarized by political participation). This paper represents our attempt to confront this previously ignored gorilla in the room, i.e., to elaborate these endogenous relationships, to derive plausible identification conditions from relevant substantive theory, to estimate empirically the resulting system, and to interpret and discuss those estimates.
II. Summary of Theoretical Conclusions
In previous work (Franzese & Hays 2008c) , we began with the Moene & Wallerstein (2001) (M&W) model of inequality, unemployment, and median-voter demand for redistribution (defined as public benefits going universally to all citizens) and social insurance (defined as public benefits targeted solely to the jobless without incomes). We first showed how the classic Meltzer & Richards (1981) (M&R) model, connecting the median-voter's desired redistribution directly to the skew of the income distribution, obtains as a special case of the M&W model with full employment (and so also no distinction between universal and targeted benefits). With unemployment but without targeting of benefits, some insurance motivation for those universal benefits arises, but the equilibrium remains otherwise identical to M&R. Thus, both unemployment and the ability to target benefits thereto are keys to the M&W model.
In that M&W model, population shares σ 0 , σ H , and σ L are, respectively, the permanently unemployed; high-income (w H ) earners who face no appreciable employment risk; and low-income (w L ) workers who face some risk, α, of losing their income (job). Job-losers have probability β of regaining employment, giving respective steady-state (un)employed population-shares of Governments levy a proportionate income-tax at rate t, all revenue from which, T, is spent, yielding Finally, a share, γ, of revenues (cum expenditures), T, goes to current earners, with the remaining (1-γ)T going to the unemployed. For our purposes, the most important results from the M&W model are these:
• With exogenous targeting (γ fixed), a mean-preserving increase in income skew (a reduction in w L holding w fixed) raises the median voter's 2 preferred social-policy generosity (t*) if all benefits go to the employed (γ=1) and lowers her preferred safety-net if all benefits go to the unemployed (γ=0). I.e., inequality increases broad redistribution but decreases targeted social-insurance.
• With endogenous targeting (both γ and t* chosen democratically), a mean-preserving increase in income skew (a reduction in w L holding w fixed) increases the median voters' preferred targeting of benefits to the employed (γ). Unconstrained desired-redistribution is increasing, and desired-insurance is decreasing, in inequality. With desired-insurance rising and the desired-total declining with equality, however, at some point all spending is targeted to the unemployed (γ=0). At this point, denoted w m =w 0 , funding of the desired insurance becomes constraining. The net implications are:
o A monotonic-positive relationship of equality to insurance (safety-net) spending, although with a kink at w 0 and a flatter positive relationship as wages-cum-equality rise beyond w 0 ;
o A weakly monotonic-negative relationship of equality to redistribution spending, being strictly negative through w 0 but flat at greater equality.
o A non-monotonic relationship of equality to total social-policy spending (social insurance + redistribution), with the sum declining as equality increases to w 0 , kinking there, and then rising as wagescum-equality increase further.
M&W Figure 3 (reprinted with permission) illustrates these conclusions graphically:
The figure reads as follows. All considerations are of mean-preserving movements in inequality, which M&W consider as movements of w L relative to fixed w . As w L increases (skew decreases), the desired, unconstrained level of benefits to the unemployed strictly increase (the smoothly upward-sloping curve)
2 M&W consider three classes, {H,L,0}, of which they assume L the median.
and that of total social-spending strictly declines (the downward-sloping curve). The unconstrained, desired share of spending targeted to the unemployed/employed (the ratio of the preceding two curves) also strictly increases/decreases. However, beyond some wage-cum-equality level, w 0 , unconstrained desired insurance exceeds the unconstrained desired total, so the constraint binds. Beyond this w 0 , all spending targets the unemployed, and this insurance-cum-total spending remains upward-sloping in wages-cum-equality, although with the desire to restrain total taxes dampening the slope. In equilibrium:
(i) targeted social-insurance strictly rises with w L (equality), albeit with a kink at w 0 and more slowly thereafter; (ii) total social-spending (insurance+redistribution) declines with w L (equality), kinks at w 0 , and rises (more slowly) thereafter; and (iii) the share of total spending targeted to the unemployed rises weakly monotonically with w L (equality), reaching unity at w 0 and staying at 100% thereafter.
M&W discuss only mean-preserving skew-increases, which they consider as falling median-incomes and fixed mean-incomes. In previous work, we extended M&W to consider median-preserving skewincreases, conceived as rising mean with fixed median incomes, i.e., as "yachts outpacing tugboats and tugboats," 3 far the more-common case empirically. In Figure 3 , raising w holding w i fixed are shifts of the curves rather than moves along them. The T(t * ) curve shifts outward as the base for the median to tax increases while her own income stays fixed. Accordingly, she wants greater social spending at whatever w i she has stagnated. The larger tax-base also enables the median to increase safety-net consumption, and, insurance being a normal good, she will. Thus, both curves shift outward; i.e., median-preserving skew-increases raise safety-net and total social-policy spending. Using the explicit equations graphed in Figure 3 (but not given here), we showed that the share of spending on the employed, γ , and so its level, must also increase. Finally, with both curves shifting upward but the total-spending curve more so, the kink point, w 0 , beyond which wage (equality) level all spending is insurance-targeted, must also shift outward (to a higher wage). Therefore, in the equilibrium with * 1 γ < , median-preserving skew-increases raise total social-policy spending, insurance (unemployed-targeted) spending, redistribution (employedtargeted) spending, and the share of redistribution in the total; and this unconstrained equilibrium applies through greater equality-levels. These notable differences between the effects of top-pulled and bottom- 3 We heard the catchy phrase from, and attribute it to, Tim Smeeding, whose work is among that establishing its commonality.
dragged increases in skew, given the empirical prevalence of the former, imply that empirical results should differ greatly depending on whether the average income-level is controlled. With/without such control, we would expect to find effects of mean-/median-preserving increases in skew, respectively.
Our previous extensions also included replacing M&W's three discrete classes with continuous voter heterogeneity and exploring correlation of unemployment-risk to income. The main implications were a flattening of the upward-sloping curve relating w i to insurance spending in Figure 3 because the incomeeffect, which alone had operated and which had induced the median's desired insurance to decline as she grew poorer, is now offset by a substitution effect as her unemployment-risk rises in tandem. Assuming that the median is employed the majority of her life, this flattening does not switch sign of the slope nor does it alter that this curve will cross the (essentially unchanged) downward-sloping total-spending curve at some w 0 < w and continue upward, flatter still, thereafter. Thus, the equilibria as previously described remain qualitatively accurate, but the flattening of the curve likely also implies that w 0 shifts rightward, expanding the range of income skews over which the simpler unconstrained results hold.
Penultimately, consider that some citizens participate more and/or more effectively politically. The the relevant population in democratic policy-choice, obviously, are voters (more generally: the politically active), and, in these models, specifically the median voter (or effective-participant). Moreover, that the relatively wealthy have higher propensity to vote than the relatively poor is well established empirically (e.g., Verba et al. 1978 , Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980 , Harrop & Miller 1987 . Generally (see Franzese 2002:72-4) , this implies that the median voter will be poorer (and closer to the median person) as voter participation increases. In Figure 3 , as participation declines, one should read median-voter preferences from a wage higher than the population median; i.e., both curves flatten. If unemployment risk also declines with income, the insurance-spending curve will shift downward as well. 4 Again, this all means w 0 , and the associated kinks in the redistribution/insurance-skew relationships, shift outward. Voting, finally, can serve here to summarize effective political participation for two reasons. First, as voting declines, the relative prevalence and influence of other participatory modes likely increases. Second, socioeconomic status correlates even more strongly with extra-electoral participation-most obviously, sizably, and notoriously: contributions: "[C]lass differences in mobilization typically aggravate rather than mitigate the effects of class differences in political resources," Rosenstone & Hansen (1993:241; Verba et al. 1978 Verba et al. , 1995 . Therefore, not only does electoral representation of the poor and highunemployment-risk decline as turnout falls, but the extent and influence of extra-electoral participation also rise and disadvantaged groups are still less-well represented there.
Finally, we turn at last to the previously ignored gorilla in the room: endogeneity. The distributional and employment outcomes that are the key explanators in these political-economic models of social policy, skew and unemployment-risk, are themselves affected by the redistribution and social-insurance policies aimed at ameliorating them. If income and income-skew are measured post-tax-and-transfer, then obviously social policies affect them as much as vice versa. However, even considering pre-taxand-transfer skew or unemployment, these social policies have important disincentive and distortionary effects. Indeed, these effects are the subject of huge literatures in welfare economics. Likewise, political participation should condition these relations of economic outcomes to policies, yet it, too, is endogenous to economic conditions whose effects on social policies we argue it moderates. 5 Therefore, empirical exploration of the theoretical propositions above simply must confront the endogeneity of economy, policy, and politics. We will adopt a simultaneous system-of-equations approach, attempting to identify the five endogenous outcomes by theoretically/substantively motivated restrictions.
III. Confronting the Gorilla: An Empirical System of Equations for Inequality & Unemployment, Redistribution & Social Insurance, and Political Participation

A. Identifying the System of Equations
Our system involves two economic conditions, U=unemployment and S=skew; two social policies, I=social insurance and R=redistribution; and P=political participation: , , , ; , , , , , ; , , , , , ; , , , , , ; , , , , ,
In general, to identify a system of M simultaneous equations-here, M=5-we must "tie down" M(M-1) 5 Notice that the expected mutually positive feedback in equality, unemployment, redistribution, insurance, and participation raises the possibility of multiple political-economic equilibria, with two basins of attraction-one of high and one of low political participation, insurance and redistribution, unemployment and equality-consonant with Alesina and Angeletos' (2005ab) social-policy multiple-equilibria, but of political-participation rather than of societal-preference provenance.
terms-here: 5x4=20-by sufficient restrictions on the equations deriving from some extra-empirical information (Greene 2003:378-95 other four equations is zero), yielding the minimum 5x4=20 needed, just-identifying the system. Finding more than the minimum additional outside information, i.e., over-identifying the system, adds efficiency ("ties down the system more firmly") and opens the possibility of testing over-identifying restrictions.
B. Identification by Exclusions among the Endogenous Variables
Consider the endogenous variables, S, U, R, I, and P, first. Starting with the economic outcomes, the M&W model indicates that Skew and not Unemployment enters the Redistribution equation, and our elaborations modified this conclusion only by extending its empirically applicable range. We argue that Unemployment does not enter our Skew equation either, at least not strongly directly. The zero wages of the unemployed do directly affect mean wages, Skew's theoretical denominator, but this effect is likely small: e.g., 10% unemployment lowers mean wages by 0.1 times the (likely low) wages when working of the jobless. Further, because extremes do not directly affect percentiles, such as the median (50 th ), and because the jobless come mostly from lower ends of wage/income distributions, we can evade much of even this small direct simultaneity by using percentile ratios instead of median-to-mean ratios to measure
Skew, especially if we use higher percentiles. That is, 90-50 ratios provide stronger basis for some of the exclusion restrictions we intend to impose than median-to-mean ratios or the 90-10 ratios commonly used. Then, too, Unemployment adds labor-supply competitors and so affects all percentiles' wages, but again mostly the lower percentiles that compete more directly with the jobless. Finally, the median-tomean ratios of the theory, which are less widely available empirically, will relate more tightly to 90-50 than 50-10 or 90-10 ratios since the 90 th -percentile numerator more heavily influences the mean than the does the 50 th and since the denominator is the desired measure exactly. U does enter the other equations though: Participation because the unemployed tend to drop from political as well as economic activity, and Insurance, obviously, the unemployed being its target. Also obviously and analytically central, Skew enters both the Redistribution and Insurance equations in the M&W model, and, by our discussion, the Participation equation too. Finally, Skew should not affect Unemployment except via its policy effects.
Turning to the policy variables, Redistribution clearly enters the Skew equation, especially insofar as our S measure reflects the post-tax-and-transfer income-distribution, such being the intent (and effect: Atkinson et al. 1995 , Danziger & Gottschalk 1995 , Gottschalk & Smeeding 1997 , Smeeding et al. 1990 ).
Redistribution indirectly affects even pre-tax-and-transfer Skew though, and also Unemployment, as it alters labor-market functioning, e.g., by raising reservation wages. Hobolt & Klemmensen (2006) , who argue and find (albeit without redressing the endogeneity problems stressed here) that social-spending recipients have higher propensity to vote even controlling for their post-tax-and-transfer SES-perhaps responding to a sense that policy regards, and so politics involves, them-we include both social policies and both economic outcomes in the participation equation.
Political Participation, finally, should affect the policy variables, R and I, but any effect on economic outcomes would surely work through policy. The remaining system is thus: ; , , , ; , , , , ; , , , , , ; , , , , ,
C. Identification by Exclusions among the Exogenous Variables
[1a] reflects imposition of the six exclusions so far, reducing the coefficients to identify from twenty to fourteen. We introduce next some potentially exogenous regressors and discuss their in/exclusions.
These regressors relate to demographics: D (e.g., the age distribution); socio-economic institutional and 6 R and I relate directly only past some critical equality-level, w 0 , at which I exhausts revenue.
interest structure: SIS (e.g., trade exposure and structure); domestic political institutions: DPI (e.g., governmental and electoral systems); and current political contexts: CPC (e.g., government partisanship and electoral competitiveness). Additionally, we might find further (imperfect) identification leverage in the international (i.e., spatial) interdependence of the economic-outcome and policy dependent-variables,
i.e., in economic conditions and policies abroad, which we will write U~i, S~i, R~i, and I~i. Thus: (Cross-national dependence of mass participation seems rather unlikely: Kayser 2007.) As Franzese & Hays (2004 , 2006a explain and explore, such spatial-lag regressors raise endogeneity issues of their own; if, e.g., France affects Germany and Germany affects France, then the spatial lag, being a weighted average of the dependent variable in the other (~i) units, is endogenous. However, this spatial-simultaneity bias may be small enough and/or redressed effectively enough by our time-lagging it (an imperfect stratagem), and the identification leverage that these spatial lags offer upon the simultaneity of central interest here (outcome and regressor simultaneity within units) large enough, to render usage of spatial lags as quasi-instruments (see Bartels 1991) advantageous.
Each quasi-instrumental spatial-lag enters one equation and so brings four exclusions, 16 more in total, two more than the 14 remaining to fulfill the necessary rank condition for identifying our system.
The order condition, however, which is necessary and sufficient with the rank condition, and which requires that the exclusions equaling or exceeding M(M-1) (here: 20) are distributed across the equations such that each is tied down by at least one unique exogenous aspect of its specification, is not satisfied yet. The Participation equation as-yet lacks such unique exogenous component, and so is unidentified, whereas the Insurance equation is just-identified, basically by its quasi-instrumental spatial-lag, and the Skew, Unemployment, and Redistribution equations are all over-identified, having both their own unique quasi-instrumental spatial-lags and three, two, or one further exclusions, respectively, from among the endogenous variables. We would also not want to rest system identification solely on quasi-instrumental variables, so we turn now to find further leverage in some of the other exogenous regressors.
2. Demographics: Demographic variables, D, may provide some regressors the exogeneity of which is more certain. 7 Unfortunately, though, most demographics relevant to one of the outcome variables would also affect most or all the others. The over-65 share of the population, Pop65, for instance, should affect Redistribution and/or Insurance (insofar as public pensions and other age-dependent spending, like health and child care, comprise those measures), but age-demographics like these certainly affect employment and income-distribution outcomes directly also (see, e.g., Smeeding & Sullivan 1998) . Age also has among the most robust and sizable known effects on voter participation, so Pop65 likely enters all the equations and so, while exogenous, provides no identification leverage for any of them (unless we could determine that it enters them differently, which we cannot). The under-15 population share, Pop14, also causally relates to economic outcomes, surely Unemployment and perhaps Skew, but, again, socialpolicy spending clearly depend on Pop14 too-e.g., education and related spending programs. Perhaps, Participation being a share of the eligible-age (i.e., over-15) population, might exclude Pop14.
Our system is now identified (if we credit the quasi-instrumentality of the spatial lags): In [1c], we indicate our situation vis-à-vis identification by placing arcs over endogenous variables, double-underlining regressors that appear in only one equation, which suffice to identify that equation's left-hand-side variable for inclusion on the right of others, and single-underlining regressors that do not appear in all equations, which provide leverage on those outcomes from which we exclude them.
Socio-Economic Institutional and Interest Structures:
Next, consider SIS factors, like unionization and corporatism, trade exposure/structure, stock-market capitalization/outcomes, and female labor-force participation. Unions serve to enhance and protect members' wages, and evidence that they affect wage and income distributions is rife (e.g., Freeman 1991 domestic stock-ownership prevalence). Less directly, more speculatively, stock-market capitalization, reflecting an emphasis on a particular form of corporate finance, may have implications for wages and employment (Hall & Soskice 2001) . This likely has the obvious implications for interest and politicalinfluence distributions as well, so we suspect SMC to enter the policy equations too. Current returns and the interaction should be less relevant (directly) to these policy variables, though, and such financialmarket terms seem unlikely to affect Participation. This brings the system-specification to this state: 
Domestic Political Institutions:
Two important DPI here are (the natural log of) district magnitude, 8 However, due caution regarding interaction terms (Brambor et al. 2006; Kam & Franzese 2007 ) adds SDG to both. 9 Policy programs in response to FLFP may also bolster FLFP, which suggests a further endogeneity not explored here. party-discipline, which eases voters' electoral-information burdens and by fostering wasted votes. As for policy, IPC favors targeted (insurance) over broader (redistribution) tools, similarly to DMag (Shugart & Carey 1992 , Cox & Rosenbluth 1995 , Ariga 2006 . Mandatory voting and registration burdens, finally, should affect policy only by affecting participation. These DPI, especially the electoral-law features, provide crucial identification leverage on Participation, which had been relatively lacking heretofore: All of these CPC factors should affect the policy variables directly; only competitiveness should affect participation directly; 10 and none should affect economic outcomes except via policy or participation.
This gives the following (penultimate) specification of our system: 
SMC Pres DMag
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Notice that theory and substance allow us to offer empirical models that strongly distinguish (identify) the three outcome-types: economy, policy, and politics. 10 We smooth participation rates across election and non-election years, so the election date does not affect our measure.
Plus, as seen below, further useful distinctions arise in precisely how each factor enters each function.
IV. Empirical-Model Specification, Data, Estimation, and Results
A. Empirical-Model Specification
Our theories generally lack the precision to suggest specific functional forms, so we assume the usual linear-additivity here. We have suggested above certain interactions among some of the regressors:
between SMC and SMR in economic outcomes, and between FLFP and SDG and between elections and competitiveness in policies. As we convert [1] to specific regression models, and add dynamics to those models, two more interactions emerge. As argued above (see also 11 We measure fragmentation and polarization to reflect how the current government's majority status relates GFrag and GPol to policy-retardation, so GMaj need not enter directly as a regressor. We did explore the possibility anyway, finding some indications, weak and not robust across specifications, that majority status may speed policy-adjustment and/or reduce insurance-spending levels beyond the role our GFrag and GPol measures allow it.
Notice that additional identification leverage for each equation arises if we assume or can establish theoretically/substantively that the predetermined nature of the temporal lags ensures exogeneity. We do assume so, although without full confidence, especially for the very slow moving Skew.
12 Notice also the Skew is usually the limiting factor, inequality data being notoriously spotty, the laudable and fruitful efforts of the Luxembourg Income Studies (Smeeding et al. 1990 , Atkinson et al. 1995 notwithstanding.
We use data on earnings by population decile, generously provided by David Rueda (Pontusson & Rueda 2000) , to construct ratios of the 90 th to the 50 th deciles' incomes. By linear interpolation of a few missing country-years (28 of the 360 total assembled), 16 we obtain unbroken annual series of at least some years for 19 of 23 countries. 17 S t-1 is a one-year time-lag; and, S~i, as with all the spatial lags, is the unweighted average of that variable, that year, in the other dataset countries. Standardized unemployment rates, U,
12 Time precedence will fail to ensure exogeneity given instantaneous (i.e., within observational-period) endogeneity or some failure of the empirical model to capture the dynamics fully (e.g., as when expectations are important and not or inadequately modeled). Here, the extremely smooth and slow dynamics of skew raise serious doubts whether our measurement precision suffices for deviations from the modeled AR(1) to have adequate signal-to-noise even to judge meeting of this condition. 13 Plümper and Tröger (2007) offer an alternative strategy that could have been fruitfully applied here. 14 Even to define Comp comparably across our heterogeneous sample of democracies is very daunting (but see Ariga 2006). 15 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., and U.S. 16 We extend available data aggressively, merging multiple data sources on several variables and by linear-interpolation and trend autoregression (more rarely), but this adds almost no usable data here beyond these few added to Skew. 17 Greece, Iceland, and Luxembourg drop, and Spain remains with just one observation, 1995.
are from the OECD via Armingeon et al. (2005) (ALMP) . Where possible, we expand coverage of these data (from 660 to 939 country-years) by country-specific linear-regression on the unstandardized rates.
The R 2 of these fitting models invariably exceed .9, suggesting a trustworthy data-coverage extension. Public Health datasets, plus current disbursements (i.e., total spending). This recreates M&W's described procedure, and yielded R 2 usually exceeding .9 and often near 1.0, indicating near-perfect replication.
We measure participation, P, using ALMP's vturn: voters' share of the eligible-age population. We smooth P by holding participation constant at the last election's rate until the next and then averaging the current, previous, and next-two years (capturing exactly one election-cycle per window in most cases). Pres is 1 in presidential (Switzerland, US), 0.5 in semi-presidential (Finland, France, Iceland, and Portugal), and 0 in parliamentary systems. It and DMag, the natural log of (average) district magnitude, are from Golder (2005) . Our intra-party competition index, IPC, is crude, as it merely sums indicators for plurality, majority, and transferable-vote electoral systems, again from Golder (2005) . 26 Our measure of authority diffusion across elections, EleDiff, adds 'effective federalism' and 'provincial-election importance' measures, from Beck et al. (2001) , to Lijphart's prevalent-referenda and effective-21 http://www.wz-berlin.de/mp/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm 22 In bicameralism, "legislature" refers to the lower (more powerful) chamber. The US president's party is the cabinet party. 23 Raw numbers represent Tsebelis' veto-actor conception of fragmentation more faithfully than effective (i.e., size-weighted) numbers (Franzese 2002, ch. 3) because, by that conception, any governing party, regardless of size, can veto policy-change since its presence in government indicates its necessity to that coalition. 24 A minority coalition need not add all other parties to build a majority to change policy, so using raw numbers of opposition parties would exaggerate. Short of analyzing each parliamentary context at length, we construct a convenient proxy for the number of veto-acting opposition parties by weighing their counts by size (i.e., using effective numbers), reflecting the notion that larger parties are more often likely to be necessary partners in building legislative majorities. 25 GPol exaggerates by thus implicitly assuming all legislative parties are veto actos. As with GFrag, GPol would do better to find some convenient generalization to reflect that larger opposition parties are likely more often in veto-acting positions than smaller ones. Cusack's data provide several useful indicators of governing and opposition fragmentation and key-party ideological locations that could improve our GPol measure, and also enhance our GFrag simplification, in future work. 26 We code the German mixed system, and the similar new ones in Italy, Japan, and New Zealand as 0.5, reflecting their partplurality nature (although in Japan, the other part is transferable-vote, so IPC is 1).
bicameralism indicators. The measure of proximity of presidential to parliamentary elections, Prox1, is Golder's (2005) . MandVote and RegReq, our compulsory-voting and registration-requirement measures derive from our own analysis of electoral-system data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 27 MandVote varies 0-1, according to the degree of enforcement indicated (none=0, weak=.5, strong=1) times the severity of punishments (none=0, nominal fine or other weak sanction=.5, appreciable fine=1) times the share of provinces in which the law is in force. RegReq simply indicates (0,1) whether a national voter-registry exists or voters must self-register. All of these indices vary little or none-at-all over time within country. 28 Our pre-election-year indicator, E, finally, allocates sums of 1 to the 365 days before lower-house elections 29 (using ALMP's dating); it does time-vary.
B. Estimation Strategies
Estimation strategies for systems of equations are numerous and variegated, as are those for timeseries cross-sections (TSCS), so the number and variety of methods potentially appropriate to estimate our system (of 5 equations, from data in 18 countries over, on average, 17-18 years) are multiplicatively great. We must consider whether to allow unexplained cross-country differences in conditional means as fixed or random effects, recognizing that failing to do so when heterogeneity (conditional on the model) exists can bias estimation (if the omitted conditional-means correlate with included regressors) and will induce inefficiency. Conversely, fixed effects debar direct recovery of the effects of any time-invariant explanators and can severely compromise estimation and complicate or obfuscate interpretation of the effects of slowly/rarely-moving regressors (Plümper & Tröger 2007) , and random effects rely on questionable assumptions, especially in aggregate TSCS contexts. We must consider also whether other variables from among the regressors belong on our list of endogenous variables. Failing to acknowledge the endogeneity of some regressors will bias results, but treating variables as endogenous that are not (or that are not too importantly so) adds to the empirical identification burden of the remaining exogenous variables and to the researcher's difficulties finding viable instruments. Then we should consider also whether the TSCS data-structure might add other exogenous factors beyond the current set to the instruments, thereby gaining further identification and estimation leverage if the additional conditions are true but inducing otherwise avoidable bias if not. Lastly, we should consider whether and how to use cross-equation information (like error covariances) or instead to estimate the 5 equations separately.
Estimating jointly can enhance efficiency notably; estimating separately forsakes these gains but insulates each equation's estimation from any specification or other problems in the others. All these considerations are additional to the many alternative plausible theoretical specifications.
The range of options we have explored include:
• Joint (3SLS), separate (2SLS), or exogenous (SUR) estimation of the system's equations;
• the inclusion or exclusion of fixed effects, deciding to include country dummies for outcomes and policies but not participation, which has several substantively core regressors that move very slowly/rarely;
• the inclusion or exclusion among the system's instruments of these country dummies, a full set of year dummies or both, choosing to include both country and year dummies as instruments;
• which regressors besides our five outcomes to consider endogenous, settling upon the interaction of Skew and Participation as the only one, its endogeneity being most crucial substantively;
30
• we also explored/reconsidered several theory-derived specification choices discussed above: affects any of the coefficient estimates nearly so much. Therefore, since estimation with heterogeneous intercepts and more instruments is far more efficient, we report estimates obtained by (iterated) 3SLS, with country dummies in [2a]-[2d], and both country and year dummies in the instrument list. 
C. Estimation Results
NOTES:
Equations estimated with country fixed-effects (omitted) simultaneously by iterated 3SLS, with S×P and the 5 dependent variables treated as endogenous, and with year and country dummies in addition to all other regressors treated as instruments. Table 1 gives estimated coefficients (in bold) and standard errors (below them); estimates significant or nearly so are in italics. The results contain strong support for some aspects of previous theory, our own additions, and/or conventional wisdom, but also many notable surprises. We will first briefly survey the estimated relationships of the exogenous explanators to the outcomes of our system before turning to our central interest in the estimated endogenous relationships among the outcomes.
In confirmatory results, we find slow temporal adjustment-rates for all five outcomes, and strong spatial interdependence for economic policies and outcomes. We find corporatism reduces income-skew; union density may do so too while it also, more surely, bolsters turnout. Smaller youth and pensioner,
i.e., larger working-age, populations boost unemployment and inequality; Pop65 also reduces turnout.
Financial (but not trade) exposure seems to spur inequality, and trade (but maybe not financial) exposure seems to boost unemployment. Greater stock-market capitalization associates with less redistribution and social insurance. Social-democratic-government legacies and female labor-force participation interact positively to expand both social policies. Current-government partisanship has strong intuitive policyeffects, with little sign that Christian Democrats lie anywhere off that left-right line. Most impressive, though, is how well political-science theories can explain turnout variation. Authority diffusion across elections, electoral systems that foster intra-party competition, non-concurrent presidential elections, and onerous registration requirements all depress turnout, and, of course, mandatory-voting laws increase it.
In more-equivocal results, we find veto-actor retardation of social-insurance policy-adjustment rates via government fragmentation, but our polarization measure fares less well, and redistribution policyadjustment rates seem impervious to either. Corporatism and union density relate to unemployment with their expected signs, but significance is marginal or lacking. The negative relation of district magnitude to both social-insurance and redistribution is unexpected, given emerging consensuses that larger DM's favor broadly targeted over narrowly targeted public-spending. However, this likely implies a positive association with the excluded health and pension spending, which one could read as more confirmatory.
Finally, cumulative SCG is not strongly distinct from cumulative CDG in social-insurance policy, further suggesting no departure of Christian Democracy from a single left-right continuum.
We also find several null or contradictory results. Stock-market capitalization seems not to affect 90-50 skew and even to reduce unemployment, and market returns fail to register upon either. The signal-to-noise ratio in our returns measure, being closing price for a single, unusual day (December 31), may be low though, and capitalization may just be proxying GDP. That age demographics and UDen fail to affect social insurance, and that corporatism associates marginally significantly negatively with it, are surprising null results. Similar null findings emerge for FLFP and DMag in the participation equation
(but note that IPC also distinguishes PR and SMD), and for electoral cycles in policy. The failure of electoral diffusion and intra-party competition, which have little and near-zero within-country variation, respectively, to register strongly in fixed-effect policy models is unsurprising. Lastly, the insignificant positive relation of FLFP to skew is surprising, and its significant negative relation to unemployment quite so, given the findings relating working-age population-share with S and U. However, we might best credit chance for this one variable of the 76 just discussed being significantly opposite of expectations. The numbers are standardized coefficients. The conditional coefficients for skew and participation assume low skew (1.44) and low participation (39.4%). *p-value < .10, **p-value < .05. Coefficients without asterisks are significant at p < .15.
Our central interests surround the causal relations among the endogenous variables of our system. allege, social-policy generosity does seem to undermine labor-market performance. Sensibly, the size and statistical significance of the effect from insurance to unemployment far exceed those of R to U.
Benefits targeted to the jobless affect work-leisure decisions more strongly than non-contingent benefits.
Scant evidence of R affecting pre-tax-and-transfer 90/50 Skew emerges, but recall that our use of pre-tax measures and of the 50 th percentile denominator intentionally minimized such direct and indirect effects.
The policy effects of Skew and Participation are indeed conditional, but not in the manner expected.
We find higher participation to attenuate the relation of skew to social-policy generosity, and that the relations of participation to both social policies flatten with greater skew. 31 Nonetheless, at low politicalparticipation and income-skew, increases in either variable significantly boost social-policy generosity, consistent with our theoretical discussion of median-preserving skew-increases. We also find some evidence of policy substitution from social insurance to redistribution but not in the other direction. This suggests that increases in insurance are met to some extent by cuts in redistribution, but increases in redistribution do not induce the converse reductions in social insurance, implying funding to greater extent by other cuts or revenue hikes. We also find that increases in unemployment may decrease socialinsurance spending, which is quite surprising, but the substantive and statistical significance is marginal.
Finally, we find no evidence of negative relationships from unemployment or skew to participation, but we do find income skew to have a small, positive, marginally significant effect on participation. This could reflect high returns from redistribution for those at lower ends of income distributions, but, more likely, the marginal substantive and statistical significance deserves emphasis. The evidence for direct policy effects on political participation are stronger, supporting Hobolt & Klemmensen (2006) ; both redistribution and social-insurance seem to bolster participation, although the latter effect is insignificant.
Our system is implicitly nonlinear in the endogenous variables due to the spatiotemporal dynamics and explicitly by the interaction of participation and skew in the R and I models; 32 this greatly complicates the presentation and interpretation. To proceed, one might first rewrite the estimated system to express each outcome as an N%1 vector of variables across the N countries in each period, t: In [3], we set small and insignificant coefficients to zero and gather exogenous explanators into one X term for convenience. We intend the nonconformable products, t t S P and 1 t t − I G , to mean element-byelement multiplication. Lastly, W is an N%N spatial-weights matrix, whose elements, w ij , reflect the connectivity from country j to country i. In our estimation model, all countries are equally connected, so
≤igj, yielding Wy as the unweighted average of y in the other units. We can now solve out the spatial feedback and express the system as a temporally dynamic model in vector notation thus: where N I is the N%N identity matrix. Next, if we assume whatever counterfactual we wish to trace occurs equally in all countries, then this particular W, reflecting uniform diffusion and resulting in unweighted averages of other units outcomes being the spatial lag, will have the extremely convenient feature that we can rewrite [3a] in a scalar notation that applies for each country thus: 
x β x β x β x β terfactual shocks (including estimated coefficients) to consider.
[3d].
Then we can rewrite the system once more to obtain three expressions for (1) the pre-spatiotemporal impulses to y from, (2) the first-period (i.e., pre-temporal but post-spatial dynamics) responses to, and (3) the spatiotemporal long-run-steady-state (LRSS) responses to, some counterfactual: 
where the symbol, ), means element-by-element multiplication. Since involves some elements of the endogenous variables, y, namely S and P in the conditional coefficients of the R and I equations, we can offer only linear-approximation estimates in the neighborhood of specific starting values of S and P.
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Furthermore, unfortunately, the estimated system finds spatiotemporal unit-roots in R and I, implying explosive LRSS responses. The estimates are very nearly stationary, though, 34 so we brazenly assume the matter to arise due to some relatively minor misspecification-linear-regression approximation to what are surely nonlinear relationships, for instance-and, in any event, inconsequentially for the short run.
For finite LRSS estimates, we crudely subtract an arbitrary 0.15 from each coefficient on the temporal lags. Both these considerations suggest strong caution with regard to our reported LRSS estimates, but perhaps we may credit the estimated pre-dynamic impulses and first-period responses more confidently. Tables 2 and 3 give all three sorts of estimated responses, at nine starting values of participation and skew ({low, mid, high}%{low, mid, high}), to one counterfactual each: respectively, a 0.2 exogenous increase in the 90-50 skew-ratio, i.e., in e s , which roughly equals the Italian or New Zealander experiences and 2/3 of the U.S. or Portuguese; and a 4.5 point increase in international financial exposure, FinExp, which roughly equals the average trend over the observed period. The tables illustrate three general aspects of our estimated system. First, due to feedbacks among the endogenous variables, the counterfactual shocks, which have direct impact on the economic outcomes only, indirectly affect all five outcomes, including the policies and politics. Second, due to the glacial spatiotemporal adjustment rates of the outcomes, our crude adjustment for outright stationarity in the policies notwithstanding, the estimated LRSS effects of permanent shocks range from about 4 to 40 times their immediate impulses. Third, while participation and skew do seem to moderate each other's effects on policies, and thereby on the other outcomes, they do so in contrast to theoretical expectations (and Franzese 2002, ch. 2) . Reading down the rows of varying participation rates within a level of skew, or down levels of skew at corresponding participation rates, the estimated effects of S and of P each increase as the other variable decreases. Because the feedbacks remain reinforcing-just decreasingly so-this reduces, but hardly eliminates, the previously mentioned probability of multiple equilibria (allhigh/low inequality, unemployment, redistribution, social insurance, and participation).
To illustrate using one specific set of results, consider the first-period responses to the hypothetical +0.2 exogenous shock to skew. Due mostly to spatial feedback (because, regarding systemic feedbacks, only redistribution affects skew and only slightly), this ultimately engenders +.22 skew, mostly reflecting the almost 9% spatial multiplier for skew. This shock directly positively affects redistributive and socialinsurance policies and, less so, political participation. Those direct effects diffuse and multiply spatially, induce indirect responses in the economic outcomes, which feedback to policies and politics. At sample mean participation and skew, the net result across all five outcomes' first-period responses are +.22 skew (i.e., a 22% "outpacing of tugboats by yachts"), + .73% unemployment, +1.77% and +1.25% of GDP in redistribution and in social insurance respectively (7-9% and 35-40% of their sample ranges and standard deviations respectively), and +.63% participation (1% of sample range and 5% of standard deviation).
IV. Conclusions
Conflicts of interest over the generosity and structure of social policy arise between the relatively poor and wealthy and between the precariously and the securely employed, suggesting theoretically that democratic demand for redistribution and social insurance should respond positively, respectively, to inequality and to inequality and unemployment. We found, empirically, direct effects from inequality (only) to both redistribution and social insurance. The generosity and structure of social policy, however, should theoretically simultaneously dampen labor-market efficiency, raising unemployment and (pretax-and-transfer) inequality, and, indeed, we found, empirically, direct effects of redistribution and (especially) social insurance on (only) unemployment. Theoretically, both inequality and unemployment and both redistribution and social insurance may also affect political participation, and so the identity and preferences of the median voter, and be affected by them. Again, we found considerable empirical support for at least some of this. Higher participation favors greater social insurance and redistribution
Page 31 of 33 both, and (especially) redistribution appreciably directly boosts participation. Economic outcomes are not directly affected by, and do not much directly affect, participation, but the theoretical circle is already indirectly closed empirically. At least indirectly, each of these five outcomes across economy, politics, and policy causally connects too and, specifically, increases, the others, raising the possibility of multiple political-economic equilibria, with higher/lower inequality and unemployment, public redistributive and social-insurance spending, and political participation working to reinforce each other.
This paper summarized the theoretical expectations regarding these endogenous relationships, suggested identification conditions derived from the theory and substance, and estimated and interpreted the resulting empirical system of equations. Our empirical analysis thus improves upon extant studies that ignore the gorilla in the room: the endogenous relationships among these political, economic, and policy variables. However, our empirical results also revealed some puzzling surprises. Clearly, much work remains to refine the empirical specification and analysis, and also to reconsider and advance our current theoretical understandings of this endogenous system of employment-risk and income inequality, redistribution and insurance policies, and effective citizen input in democracy.
